the interview with preferably the household head, or spouse if the household head was unavailable. The enumerators would obtain oral informed consent to conduct the interview, and emphasized that the respondent could opt out of the interview at all times. Non-response rates to the surveys were very low; less than 3% in 1998 and less than 1% in 2007.
II. Experiments
For the experiments we drew a stratified random sample from our list of villages (interviewed in 1998 and 2007) . We based our stratification on the incidence of war-related violence at the village level. In our 2007 survey we obtained information from the village officials about the incidence of violent attacks in their villages, between 1993 and 2003. We ended up with a sample of 36 villages: 25 experienced violence and 11 did not. In one of these villages we were unable to conclude the experiments. Of the 306 household heads that were invited to the experiment 26 did not show up. The most important reasons were a move to a different location (19%), illness (15%), other businesses (11.5%), unable to find them when the village official came round to their house (11.5%), or for reasons unknown (43%).
The experiments were conducted during March-April 2009 in collaboration with Ligue Iteka, a Burundian non-governmental human rights organization. The organization has a long history of operation as well as nationwide coverage in Burundi and has a solid reputation of being trustworthy amongst Burundians.
We organized an extensive training of our local experimenters and ran several pilot tests to ensure that our typical participant was able to understand our experiments without much effort. A day before the experiments, research coordinators contacted local government officials in each research site, and asked them to invite the household heads of the 2007 survey participants. The experiments started at approximately 9 a.m., and lasted about three hours. Each session started with a general introduction in which the participants were informed, among other things, that upon completion of the session they would receive a show-up fee of 2000 FBU plus or minus the amount of money they would gain or lose as a result of their decisions during the session. The games were implemented by three teams, each with one instructor and two research assistants. Subjects who had difficulty completing record sheets by themselves were helped by research assistants who carefully avoided giving specific instructions about how to answer.
As many of our participants had received little or no education, we followed a relatively simple design and our experimenters used clear and visual instructions to make it easier for illiterate subjects to understand the consequences of any decisions they made in the games.
1 In each session the social preference experiment was implemented first, followed by the risk and time preference experiments. After subjects completed all experiments we randomly determined which pairwise choice was to be paid in the risk and time preference experiment. The average experimental earnings for three games were about 6000 FBU 
A. Social Preference Experiment
To measure social preferences we used a modified version of the social value orientation experiment devised by Wim B.G. Liebrand (1984) . In this experiment, subjects (denoted as i, j) are presented with 6 pairwise choices between two own-other payoff combinations. 
B. Risk Preference Experiment
3 Originating in the social psychology literature this experiment is now frequently applied in the economics literature as well (Theo Offerman, Joep Sonnemans and Arthur Schram 1996) . In these versions subjects are offered 24 pair wise allocations, covering all four quadrants of the circle. Pretesting revealed that the cognitive burden of making all 24 choices was too large for our (largely illiterate) subject pool. We decided to just offer subjects pair-wise choices in the "first quadrant" of the social orientation circle--corresponding to positive amounts for both the giver and receiver. We thus reduced the cognitive burden imposed on our illiterate subjects at the cost of reduced precision with which pro-social preferences can be measured.
Risk preferences were measured using a game based on William T. Harbaugh, Kate Krause and Lise Vesterlund (2002) . Subjects were presented with 6 choice cards, each of which presented them a choice between A: receiving (or losing) an amount of money with certainty (y, that varied between the 6 choice cards), and B: participating in a game where they may either gain (lose) 2000 FBU with probability 0.3, or gain (lose) nothing with probability 0.7.
Hence, the expected absolute value of the gamble was always the same (600 FBU. This was an expected gain for three cards and an expected loss for the other three cards), whereas we varied the amount of money to be received with certainty (y); see Table A2 . For both gains and losses the certain bid (y) was lower, equal to, and higher than the expected value of the gamble. As the certain payoff (y) in A increases, the gamble in B becomes less attractive.
The point at which a subject switches from the risky to the safe alternative allows us to determine her degree of risk aversion. 
Example Record Sheet Risk Preference Experiment
The probabilities of the gamble (0.3 of winning/losing 2000 FBU, and 0.7 of receiving nothing) were represented visually using three black and seven white balls. To illustrate the chances of winning/losing money, the ten balls were put into a bag in the presence of all participants in the session. We would then shake the bag with the balls to convince the audience that the balls were all mixed. Next, we drew one ball from the bag about ten timeswith replacement -to show the participants that the likelihood of drawing a black ball (implying winning/losing money) was less than half the likelihood of drawing a white ball (resulting in zero payoffs). The choice cards displayed the options both numerically and graphically with each change in money stock represented by an equivalent number of banknotes. Payoffs for this second experiment were not determined until after the third experiment had been completed. Then, payoffs were determined by first selecting which of the six cards was to be implemented. Six numbered balls were put into a bag to randomly select one card to be played for payment. Those subjects who had chosen the safe option A were informed about the amount of money y, as stated on that card, they were to receive (or had to pay). For those who had chosen the gamble, option B, the seven white balls and the three black balls were put into the bag again to determine whether they would receive (have to pay) 2000 FBU (when any of the three black balls were drawn), or whether they received nothing (if one of the seven white balls was drawn). Note that we made sure that at the end of the experiment all subjects had non-negative earnings because of the 2000 FBU show-up fee.
C. Time Preference Experiment
To measure time preferences, we follow Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau and Melonie B.
Williams (2002) and presented subjects with a set of nine simple pairwise choices between two options: receiving an amount of money at some date in the near future, and receiving a larger sum at a later time. The amounts of money were to be delivered by the same trustworthy local NGO, Ligue Iteka. However future money is always less certain than instantaneous money. Consequently, we provided subjects with a choice between two future options -receiving money tomorrow, or in 15 days -rather than one "instant" versus one future income option. The two options to choose from were A: receive 1000 BFU in one day, and B: receive 1000(1 d) FBU in two weeks plus one day, with d equal to 0.00, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.40, 0.70, and 1.00; see Table A3 . Thus, at the highest interest rate subjects earned an additional 1000 FBU by waiting two weeks. In the experiment subjects were asked to identify their switching point from preferring A to preferring B. Increasing the interest rate d over the nine decisions allows us to observe the point at which a subject switches from preferring 1000 FBU tomorrow to preferring 1000(1 + d) FBU in two weeks plus one day.
The switching point serves as a measure of the subject's discount rate; the earlier people switch from A to B the more patient they are. 
Example Record Sheet Time Preference Experiment
After subjects completed all questions (and after having determined the payoffs for the social orientation game and the risk preference game), we randomly determined which pairwise choice was to be paid in the time preference experiment. To do so, we put 9 numbered balls into a bag, and picked one randomly. The choice made for that question (i.e. A or B) then determined how much money was delivered, and when.
Upon completion of this third game participants were informed about their revenues in the social orientation game, the payments for the risk preference game were determined according to the procedure explained above, and they received the associated earnings, plus their showup fee.
The pay-off of the time preference game was placed in a sealed envelope and handed over to a representative of the regional office of the local non-governmental organization. All participants received a receipt stating the amount of money they were entitled to. At the relevant date (either the next day, or 15 days later), the representative went back to the community to deliver envelopes to the respective participants, in return for the their receipts.
To ascertain that the money envelopes were indeed delivered by our local organization, we checked whether all receipts were collected -which was indeed the case. The participants were informed about this procedure in advance. 
